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Abstract
This paper presents an ordered search model in which consumers search
both for price and product fitness. We show that there is price dispersion in
equilibrium and prices rise in the order of search. The top firms in consumer
search order, though charge lower prices, earn higher profits due to their larger
market shares.
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1 Introduction
In a variety of circumstances, consumers need to search to find a satisfactory product.
However, not as most of the search literature assumes, the order in which consumers
search through alternatives is often not random. For example, when facing options
in a list such as links on a search engine webpage, dishes on a menu, or candidates
on a ballot paper, people often consider them from the top down; when shopping
in a high street, a bazaar, or a supermarket, consumers’ search order is restricted
by the spatial locations of sellers or products; when we go to a travel agent to buy
airline tickets or a financial advisor to buy a savings product, the advisor may tell
us the options one by one in a predetermined order.
∗I am grateful to Mark Armstrong and John Vickers for helpful discussions. Financial support
from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) and the British Academy is gratefully
acknowledged. Contact information: jidong.zhou@ucl.ac.uk.
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In a costly search environment, the order in which consumers sample products is
an important determinant of their choices, and conceivably firms can increase their
sales by occupying top positions in consumer search process. In eﬀect it is a common
practice for firms to pay for their products to be displayed in favorable positions. For
example, manufacturers pay supermarkets for access to prominent positions; firms
bid for sponsored links on search engines; sellers pay more for salient advert slots
in yellow page directories. What is less clear is how non-random consumer search
(which may be itself a consequence of marketing competition) aﬀects firms’ pricing
behavior in the market.
Arbatskaya (2007) has studied an ordered search model where firms supply a
homogeneous product and all consumers search sequentially in a predetermined
order. Since consumers only care about price, in equilibrium the price should decline
with the rank of products, otherwise no rational consumer would have an incentive
to sample products in unfavorable positions.1 We will consider an ordered search
model with horizontally diﬀerentiated products where consumers search both for
price and product fitness. Our model is not only more realistic, especially for markets
where consumers have diverse tastes, but also provides new insights into firms’
pricing incentive in an ordered-search environment. In particular, we will show
that, with product diﬀerentiation, the price will rise with the rank of products.
This is essentially because a firm positioned earlier in consumer search process has
a more price sensitive demand. Therefore, introducing product diﬀerentiation may
significantly change the price prediction in an ordered search model. Our prediction
is consistent with the observation that a product displayed in a favorable position–
such as a book at the entrance to a bookshop–is often sold at a discount. The top
firms in consumer search order, though charge lower prices, still earn higher profits
due to their larger market shares, which also supports the fact that firms are willing
to pay for top positions.
The search model with diﬀerentiated products is initiated by Wolinsky (1986)
and further developed by Anderson and Renault (1999). Both papers consider ran-
dom consumer search. More recently, Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2007) (AVZ
thereafter) use that framework to model prominence by assuming that all consumers
1An earlier paper on ordered consumer search is Perry and Wigderson (1986). There is two-sided
asymmetric information in their model: products are homogenous but each seller has uncertain
costs, and consumers diﬀer in their willingness-to-pay for the product. They also assume no scope
for going back to a previous oﬀer. They argue that in equilibrium the observed prices, on average,
could be non-monotonic in the order of sellers.
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will sample a prominent product first and, if it is not satisfactory, they will continue
to search randomly among other products.2 One result in AVZ is that in equilibrium
the prominent product is cheaper than others.3 This paper considers a completely
ordered search model and generalizes the price result in AVZ. Another important
diﬀerence emerged in our ordered search model is, when there are more than two
firms, the form of consumers’ optimal stopping rule crucially depends on whether
they expect a rising or declining price sequence. Hence, we need to deal with the
issue of multiple equilibria, which is absent is AVZ.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
and it is analyzed in section 3. Section 4 concludes and discusses possible extensions.
Technical proofs are included in the Appendix.
2 A Model of Ordered Search
Our underlying model of consumer choice is based on the framework developed by
Wolinsky (1986). There are n ≥ 2 firms indexed by 1, 2, · · · , n, each of which sup-
plies a single product at a constant unit cost which we normalize to zero. There
are a large number of consumers with measure of one, and each consumer has a
unit demand for one product. The value of a firm’s product is idiosyncratic to
consumers. Specifically, (u1, u2, · · · , un) are the values attached by a consumer to
diﬀerent products, and uk is assumed to be independently drawn from a common
distribution F (u) on [umin, umax] which has a positive and diﬀerentiable density func-
tion f(u). Therefore, there are no systematic quality diﬀerences among products.
We also assume that all match utilities are realized independently across consumers.
The surplus from buying one unit of firm k’s product at price pk is uk − pk. If all
match utilities and prices are known, a consumer will choose the product providing
the highest surplus. If uk−pk < 0 for all k, she will leave the market without buying
anything.
Initially, however, we assume consumers have imperfect information about prices
2Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) construct a related empirical non-random search model, where
investors sample diﬀerentiated mutual funds with unequal probabilities. But they did not ex-
plore theoretical predictions of their model, and there is also no empirical conclusion about the
relationship between sampling probability and price.
3AVZ also examine the welfare impact of introducing a prominent product. They show that
making a product prominent will usually increase industry profit but decrease consumer surplus
and total welfare.
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and match values. They must gather information through a sequential search pro-
cess. By incurring a search cost s > 0, a consumer can find out any product’s price
and match utility. We assume that the search process is without replacement and
there is costless recall (i.e., a consumer can return to any product she has sampled
without extra cost). Departing from the traditional search literature, we suppose
that all consumers sample firms in an exogenously specified order. Without loss of
generality, firm k will be sampled before firm k + 1.
Firms know their own positions in consumers’ search process, and they simulta-
neously set prices pk (k = 1, 2, · · · , n) to maximize profit.
3 Analysis
3.1 Demand
We first analyze consumers’ search behavior. Let a solveZ umax
a
(u− a)dF (u) = s. (1)
Thus, if there is no price diﬀerence among products and if a consumer has found
a product with match value a, she is indiﬀerent between buying this product and
sampling one more product. As long as the search cost is not too high, a exists
uniquely and decreases with s. Throughout this paper, we assume the search cost
is relatively small such that in equilibrium pk < a for all k and so each firm has a
chance to be sampled by consumers.4
The form of consumers’ optimal stopping rule depends on whether they expect
a rising or declining price sequence. Since we aim to show that p1 < p2 < · · · <
pn < a is an equilibrium, we first assume that consumers hold such an expectation
of increasing prices. We will discuss the issue of multiple equilibria in Section 3.3,
4When a consumer expects p1 < a, her expected surplus from sampling product 1 is
R umax
p1
(u−
p1)dF (u) − s > 0 and so she is willing to participate in the market. Similarly, when a consumer
expects pk+1 < a, there is a positive probability that she will further sample product k + 1 after
sampling the first k products. Therefore, pk < a for all k ensures that every firm is active in the
market. However, as usual in search models, there are uninteresting equilibria where consumers
are only willing to sample the first k ≤ n − 1 products, because they expect that all other firms
are charging very high prices such that visiting them is not worthwhile at all. Since they do not
expect consumers to visit them, those firms have no incentive to lower their prices. We do not
consider these equilibria further.
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and there we will exclude the possibility of an equilibrium with declining prices.5
The Optimal Stopping Rule Suppose consumers expect an increasing price se-
quence pe1 < pe2 < · · · < pen < a. Then the optimal stopping rule is charac-
terized by a sequence of decreasing cutoﬀ reservation surplus levels z1 > z2 >
· · · > zn−1, where zk ≡ a − pek+1. That is, if a consumer has already sam-
pled k firms (with k ≤ n − 1), she will search on if the maximum surplus so
far vk ≡ max{0, u1 − p1, · · · , uk − pk} is less than zk; otherwise she will stop
searching and buy the best product so far. After sampling all products, she
will either buy the best one if it provides positive surplus, or leave the market
without buying anything.
With such a stopping rule, consumers seem to be making “myopic” search deci-
sions because at each firm k ≤ n− 1 they behave as if there were only one firm left.
But it proves to be optimal by means of backward induction. When a consumer has
already sampled product n− 1, it is clear that she should sample product n further
if and only if the maximum surplus so far is less than zn = a− pen according to the
definition of a in (1). Now make the inductive assumption and consider the situation
when she has already sampled product k ≤ n− 2. If vk is less than zk = a− pek+1,
then sampling product k+1 is always worthwhile. If vk is greater than zk, expecting
that she will stop searching whatever surplus she discovers at the next firm (because
of vk+1 ≥ vk > zk > zk+1 and the inductive assumption), she should actually cease
her search now.
We now derive demand functions. We claim that firm k’s demand when it charges
pk is
qk(pk) = hk [1− F (zk−1 + pk)] + rk, (2)
where
hk =
Q
j≤k−1
F (zk−1 + pj)
is the number of consumers who visit firm k, and
rk =
nX
i=k
Z zi−1
zi
f(u+ pk)
Q
j≤i,6=k
F (u+ pj)du.
For this expression to be valid for every k, we use z0 = a−pe1, zn = 0, and
Q
j≤0 = 1.
5There is no such an issue when n = 2 or when consumers sample randomly among all other
firms after visiting firm 1 as in AVZ.
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This demand function can be understood as follows. A consumer will come to
firm k if she does not stop at any of the first k − 1 firms (i.e., if vi < zi for all
i ≤ k − 1). This condition is equivalent to vk−1 < zk−1, since vi increases weakly
while the cutoﬀ reservation surplus level zi decreases. So the probability of this event
is Pr (vk−1 < zk−1) = hk. (In particular, h1 = 1 since all consumers sample product
1 first.) This consumer will immediately buy at firm k if she finds out uk − pk is
greater than zk−1. This is because now vk > zk−1 > zk and so she will not search
on, and at the same time all previous products have surplus lower than zk−1. The
probability of that is 1− F (zk−1 + pk). This explains the first term in (2), and we
illustrate it as (a) in Figure 1 below.
If this consumer finds out uk − pk is less than zk−1 but greater than zk, she will
not search on either, but she will buy at firm k only if product k is better than
each previous product. (That is, firm k is now competing with all firms positioned
before it but none of those positioned after it.) The (unconditional) probability of
this whole event is
Pr(max{zk, vk−1} < uk − pk < zk−1)
=
Z zk−1+pk
zk+pk
Q
j≤k−1
F (uk − pk + pj) dF (uk)
=
Z zk−1
zk
f(u+ pk)
Q
j≤k−1
F (u+ pj)du,
where the second equality is from changing the integral variable from uk to u =
uk − pk. This explains the first term in rk, and we illustrate it as (b) in Figure 1.
If this consumer finds out uk − pk is less than zk but greater than zk+1, then the
only possibility that she will patronize firm k eventually is when vk−1 is also less
than zk (which means that she will continue to sample product k + 1 but none of
further ones), and product k is the best one among the first k + 1 products. (Now
firm k is competing not only with all firms positioned before it but also with one
positioned after it). The (unconditional) probability of this whole event is
Pr (max{zk+1, vk−1, uk+1 − pk+1} < uk − pk < zk)
=
Z zk+pk
zk+1+pk
Q
j≤k+1,6=k
F (uk − pk + pj) dF (uk)
=
Z zk
zk+1
f(u+ pk)
Q
j≤k+1,6=k
F (u+ pj)du,
where the second equality is again from changing the integral variable. This explains
the second term in rk, and we illustrate it as (c) in Figure 1. In general, the term
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indexed by i in rk is firm k’s demand when uk − pk ∈ (zi, zi−1).
uk − pk uk+1 − pk+1
-
if vk−1 < zk−1
-
if vk < zk
firm k firm k + 1 · · ·
zk−1
zk
zk+1
(a) buy at k
(b) buy from 1 to k
(c) search and buy from
1 to k + 1 if vk−1 < zk
...
Figure 1: Consumer Decision at firm k
Using the terminology in AVZ, we call the first portion of demand in (2) the “fresh
demand” and the second portion of demand (i.e., rk) the “returning demand”.6
Notice that hk is independent of firm k’s actual price. This is because whether a
consumer will come to firm k is not aﬀected by its actual price but by this consumer’s
expectation of pk. Also notice that how a firm’s returning demand varies with its
actual price only depends on the density function f . In particular, for the uniform
distribution, a firm’s returning demand is independent of its actual price. When a
firm increases its price, more consumes will search on (which implies a larger number
of potential returning consumers), but they will be less likely to return to this firm.
In the uniform setting, these two eﬀects just cancel out each other. As a result, in
the uniform setting, returning demand is less price responsive than fresh demand.7
3.2 Equilibrium prices and profits
The above analysis of demand is predicated on that consumers hold an expectation
of increasing prices, and now we want to verify that p1 < p2 < · · · < pn < a
6Notice that the first term in rk is derived when the consumer does not search on, so the name
of “returning demand” is not appropriate for it. We include it in rk simply because it shares the
similar price elasticity with all other terms in rk.
7More generally, when a firm raises its price, its fresh demand will decrease for sure since more
consumers will then search on. But part of these consumers will become returning consumers,
which is a positive eﬀect of raising a firm’s price on its returning demand. Therefore, we expect
that returning demand is less price sensitive than fresh demand even for more general distributions.
From the expression for rk in (2), we can see that this happens at least when the density function
increases or does not decrease too fast.
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is indeed an equilibrium. For simplicity, from now on we focus on the case with
uniform distribution on [0, 1] (i.e., F (u) = u). Then a defined in (1) equals 1−
√
2s.
We keep the following condition to ensure pk < a in equilibrium:
s ∈ (0, 1/8) , or a ∈ (1/2, 1) . (3)
Since in the uniform case both hk and rk are independent of firm k’s actual price
pk, profit maximization yields the first-order condition:8
hk (1− zk−1 − 2pk) + rk = 0, (4)
where
hk =
Q
j≤k−1
(zk−1 + pj); rk =
nX
i=k
Z zi−1
zi
Q
j≤i,6=k
(u+ pj)du.
Using the fact that consumers’ expectation is fulfilled in equilibrium (i.e., zk−1 =
a− pk), we have
pk = 1− a+
rk
hk
. (5)
Since hk (1− a) is firm k’s fresh demand in equilibrium, rk/hk is proportional to the
ratio of returning demand to fresh demand. Then the economic meaning of (5) is
that a firm whose demand consists of more returning demand proportionally will
charge a higher price.
Although it is infeasible to solve equilibrium prices analytically, they exist and
have the following property (all omitted proofs are included in the Appendix):9
Proposition 1 Under condition (3), our ordered search model has an equilibrium
with
1− a < p1 < p2 < · · · < pn < 1/2.
The intuition of this result is as follows: the restricted consumer search order
tends to make firm k have more fresh demand proportionally than firm k+1, while
8In the uniform-distribution setting, the first-order condition is suﬃcient for no local profitable
deviation. However, if firm k deviates to a too high price (pk > 1 − zk), its fresh demand will
become zero and its returning demand will become price dependent. This may make the profit
function no longer globally concave. However, as in AVZ, we can show that, given other firms are
charging their equilibrium prices, firm k’s profit function is decreasing at any pk > 1− zk. Thus,
the equilibrium price we derived below is still valid.
9We have not developed a proof for uniqueness, but numerical simulations suggest that, under
condition (3), within the region of [0, 1]n the system of first-order conditions (5) has a unique
solution in (1− a, 1/2)n.
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fresh demand is more price sensitive than returning demand. Therefore, firm k has
an incentive to charge a lower price than firm k + 1. (We also expect our result to
hold even for more general distributions so long as fresh demand is more price sen-
sitive than returning demand (see the discussion in footnote 7).) The graph below
depicts equilibrium prices when there are three firms, where the three curves from
the bottom up represent p1, p2 and p3, respectively.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Prices With a When n = 3
Two polar cases deserve mention: First, when the search cost is suﬃciently
small (a ≈ 1), consumers tend to sample all firms before they purchase, and so
non-random search order has no impact and all prices will converge to the full-
information equilibrium price p¯, say, which satisfies np¯ = 1− p¯n. (This formula for p¯
is obtained from (5) by letting a→ 1.) Second, when the search cost is suﬃciently
large (a ≈ 1/2), all prices will converge to the monopoly price 1/2. Here, the high
search cost makes a consumer willing to stop searching whenever she finds a product
which yields her positive surplus, and so each firm acts as a monopolist. Therefore,
the price dispersion caused by non-random consumer search is most pronounced
when the search cost is at an intermediate level.10
In equilibrium firm k has a larger demand than firm k+1 (since both hk > hk+1
and rk > rk+1 hold), but it charges a lower price. Hence, it is a priori unclear
whether firm k earns more or less than firm k + 1. Let πk be firm k’s equilibrium
profit. The following result indicates that the demand eﬀect dominates.
10Another polar case is when there are a large number of firms in the market (n→∞). In that
case, all prices will converge to 1− a. This is because rnhn <
R a
pn
¡u
a
¢n−1 du, and the latter tends to
zero as n→∞.
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Proposition 2 Firm 1 earns more than firm 2. For k ≥ 2, firm k earns more than
firm k + 1 at least when a < n/ (n+ 1).
Though we only derive a suﬃcient condition for πk > πk+1 with k ≥ 2, numerical
simulations suggest that it is true for any a ∈ (1/2, 1). The following graph is an
example with three firms, where the curves from the top down represent π1, π2 and
π3, respectively.11
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Profits With a When n = 3
3.3 Are there other equilibria?
Our analysis so far has shown that a rising price sequence is an equilibrium outcome.
Nevertheless, we have not yet discussed other possible equilibria. Particularly, we
want to know whether a decreasing price sequence (as in Arbatskaya (2007)) could
also be an equilibrium outcome.12
Suppose consumers hold an expectation of a > pe1 ≥ pe2 ≥ · · · ≥ pen (but their
search order is still restricted). According to Kohn and Shavell (1974), their optimal
stopping rule is well defined and is characterized by a sequence of cutoﬀ reservation
surplus levels (z1, · · · , zn−1). That is, a consumer at firm k ≤ n− 1 will continue to
search if and only if the maximum surplus so far is less than zk. One can further
11This example also shows that in an ordered search market firms positioned relatively down
in consumer search process can benefit from the reduction of search cost. When the search cost
becomes smaller (i.e., when a increases), the market share redistribution eﬀect due to the restricted
search order is weakened, which tends to harm firm 1 but benefit firms 2 and 3. At the same time, a
smaller search cost implies more intense price competition, which harms all firms. The combination
of these two eﬀects explains why π1 decreases while π2 and π3 vary non-monotonically with a.
12It is still an open question whether our ordered search model has equilibria with non-monotonic
price sequences.
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show that z1 ≤ · · · ≤ zn−1 = a−pen and zk ≥ a−pek+1 for all k ≤ n−1.13 (To have a
unified expression for demand functions, we use zn = a− pen though at firm n there
is no need to set a cutoﬀ reservation surplus level at all.)
Now we derive demand functions. For firm k, a consumer will come to it if
ui− pi < zi for all i ≤ k− 1. If she finds out uk− pk ≥ zk, she will buy immediately
since she will not search on and product k is better than all previous ones (because
of increasing zi); if she finds out uk−pk < zk, then she will continue to search. Once
she leaves, she will eventually return and buy at firm k only when she has sampled
all products (again because of increasing zi) and product k has the highest positive
surplus. Hence, firm k’s demand is
qk (pk) = Pr (ui − pi < zi for i ≤ k − 1 and uk − pk ≥ zk)
+Pr (ui − pi < zi for i ≤ k − 1 and max{vk−1, uj − pj}j≥k+1 < uk − pk < zk)
= hk [1− (pk + zk)] + rk,
where hk =
Q
i≤k−1 (zi + pi) is the number of consumers who come to firm k, and rk
represents the number of returning consumers. In our uniform setting, rk is again
independent of firm k’s actual price pk. Moreover, we have rk ≤ rk+1. This is
because, if a consumer has left both firm k and firm k + 1, the former’s product
must on average have a lower net surplus given zk ≤ zk+1, and so it can win this
consumer back less likely.
Due to the restricted search order, firm k tends to have more fresh demand than
firm k+1. At the same time, firm k has less returning demand than firm k+1 as we
have pointed out. Since fresh demand is again more price sensitive than returning
demand, firm k will actually have an incentive to charge a lower price. This leads
to a contradiction. We formalize this argument in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Our ordered search model has no equilibrium with a > p1 ≥ p2 ≥
· · · ≥ pn.
13Keep the notation vk ≡ max{0, u1− p1, · · · , uk− pk}. First of all, at firm n− 1, zn−1 = a− pen
is simply from the definition of a. Now consider a consumer at firm n−2. If vn−2 < a−pen−1, then
sampling product n−1 is always worthwhile. If vn−2 ≥ zn−1, this consumer will never sample firm
n no matter what surplus she discovers at firm n− 1, and so she has no incentive to just visit firm
n− 1 given vn−2 ≥ zn−1 = a− pen ≥ a− pen−1. Thus, we have a− pen−1 ≤ zn−2 ≤ zn−1. The same
logic can go backward further to explain the property of the stopping rule.
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4 Conclusion
This paper has presented an ordered search model with diﬀerentiated products in
which consumers search both for price and product fitness. We have shown that in
equilibrium there is price dispersion and prices rise in the order of search. The top
firms in consumer search process, though charge lower prices, earn higher profits
due to their larger market shares.
We have focused on the case where all consumers have the same search cost.
When consumers have heterogenous search costs, those with higher search costs are
more likely to buy at the top firms, which provides the top firms an incentive to
charge higher prices. The final price prediction will then depend on the relative
importance of the eﬀect from product diﬀerentiation as this paper has identified
and the eﬀect from heterogeneous search costs.
We have also restricted our attention to the case with exogenous search order.14
It would be interesting to endogenize consumer search order through, for example,
advertising competition or bidding for online paid placements. Hann and Moraga-
Gonzalez (2007) consider a similar search model with diﬀerentiated products in
which a consumer’s likelihood of sampling a firm is proportional to that firm’s ad-
vertising intensity. But in symmetric equilibrium, all firms set the same price and
advertise with the same intensity, and consumers end up searching randomly. Chen
and He (2006), and Athey and Ellison (2007) present two auction models in which
advertisers bid for sponsor-link positions on a search engine. Distinct from other
papers on position auctions, they have a formal search model in the consumer side.
In equilibrium, consumers search through the sponsor links in the order presented
since they anticipate that high-quality links will be placed higher up the listing,
and higher-quality firms do have a greater incentive to buy top positions given con-
sumers’ search order. But there is no eﬀective price competition between sellers
in both papers, and so no role for non-random consumer search to aﬀect market
prices.15
14Given our equilibrium price result, consumers’ search order is actually rational since the top
firms are charging lower prices. But if we allow consumers to choose their search order freely, then
random search with a uniform price in the market will also be an equilibrium outcome.
15Chen and He (2006) do have prices charged by advertisers, but the structure of consumer
demand in their model means that the Diamond Paradox is present, and all firms set monopoly
prices.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We will first show that, in the uniform setting, under the condition a ∈ (1/2, 1) our
ordered search model has an equilibrium with 1− a ≤ p1 ≤ · · · ≤ pn ≤ 1/2. We will
then exclude the possibility of equalities.
Suppose consumers hold an expectation of pe = (pe1, · · · , pen) with 1− a ≤ pe1 ≤
· · · ≤ pen ≤ 1/2. Given other firms’ prices p−k, the demand function of firm k is
qk(pk) = hk (1− zk−1 − pk) + rk,
where
hk =
Q
j≤k−1
(zk−1 + pj); rk =
nX
i=k
Z zi−1
zi
Q
j≤i,6=k
(u+ pj)du.
More precisely, since we are using uniform distribution on [0, 1], every term (x+ pj)
in hk and rk should be replaced by min{1, x+ pj}. Notice that both hk and rk are
independent of firm k’s actual price pk, and so we can write the first-order condition
as
2pk = 1− zk−1 +
rk
hk
. (6)
Step 1: Given pe, the system of (6) for k = 1, · · · , n has a solution with
pk = γk (p
e) ∈ [1− a, 1/2] .
Equation (6) defines the best response of pk to other prices p−k, which we denote
pk = bk (p−k;pe). First, from 2pk ≥ 1 − zk−1 = 1 − a + pek ≥ 2 (1− a), we have
pk ≥ 1− a. Second, since zi decreases and zn = 0, we have
rk ≤ hk
nX
i=k
(zi−1 − zi) = hkzk−1,
and so (6) implies pk ≤ 1/2. Hence, given pe we can now construct a continuous
mapping
b (p;pe) = [b1 (p−1;pe) , · · · , bn (p−n;pe)]
from [1− a, 1/2]n to itself. A fixed-point argument yields our result.
Step 2: Given pe, we have γk+1 (pe) ≥ γk (pe).
From (6), we have
2 (pk+1 − pk) = zk−1 − zk +
rk+1
hk+1
− rk
hk
≥ zk−1 − zk +
1
hk
(rk+1 − rk) ,
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where the inequality is because hk ≥ hk+1. (The equality holds if both of them equal
to one.) On the other hand, if we let
A =
nX
i=k+1
Z zi−1
zi
Q
j≤i,6=k,k+1
(u+ pj)du,
then
rk+1 − rk = (pk − pk+1)A−
Z zk−1
zk
Q
j≤k−1
(u+ pj) du
≥ (pk − pk+1)A− (zk−1 − zk)hk.
Therefore,
2 (pk+1 − pk) ≥
A
hk
(pk − pk+1) ,
which implies pk+1 − pk ≥ 0.
Step 3: The above analysis implies that, for any consumer expectation pe in the
domain of Ω = {p ∈ [1− a, 1/2]n : p1 ≤ · · · ≤ pn} (which is compact and convex),
the price competition has an equilibrium γ (pe) = [γ1(pe), · · · , γn (pe)] which also
lies in Ω. Thus, a fixed-point argument implies that our ordered search model has
an equilibrium in Ω.
Step 4: We now exclude the equality possibility. First, given pk ≤ 1/2, in
equilibrium zk−1 = a− pk > 0 under the condition a ∈ (1/2, 1). Also recall that we
use zn = 0. Thus, rk > 0 and so equation (5) in the main text implies pk > 1− a.
Second, notice that in equilibrium
rn =
Z a−pn
0
Q
j≤n−1
(u+ pj) du < hn (a− pn) .
So equation (5) for k = n implies pn < 1/2. Finally, given the equilibrium price
p ∈ Ω and the condition a ∈ (1/2, 1), hk is strictly greater than hk+1. Then, a
similar argument as in Step 2 implies pk+1 > pk.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Notice that πk > pk+1qk(pk+1) since firm k can at least charge the same price as firm
k + 1. Thus, it suﬃces to show qk(pk+1) > qk+1(pk+1), or
hk(1− a+ pk − pk+1) + rk > hk+1(1− a) + rk+1. (7)
(Due to the higher cutoﬀ reservation surplus level at firm k, it may now have less
fresh demand than firm k + 1.) Decompose rk into two parts: rk = Ak +Bk, where
Ak =
Z a−pk
a−pk+1
Q
j≤k−1
(u+ pj)du
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is the first term in rk and Bk includes all other terms. It is ready to see Bk > rk+1
since pk < pk+1.
For k = 1, we further have Ak = hk(pk+1−pk), and so (7) holds since hk > hk+1.
That is, firm 1 must earn more than firm 2.
For k ≥ 2, we have
Ak > (pk+1 − pk)
Q
j≤k−1
(a− pk+1 + pj) > (pk+1 − pk)hk+1,
and so (7) holds if (hk−hk+1) [1− a− (pk+1 − pk)] > 0, or equivalently pk+1− pk <
1− a. A looser suﬃcient condition is rk+1/hk+1 < 1− a by using (5). Moreover, we
know that rk/hk increases with k, and so it suﬃces to show rn/hn < 1− a. From
rn
hn
<
Z a
pn
³u
a
´n−1
du =
an − pnn
nan−1
<
a
n
, (8)
we obtain the suﬃcient condition a < n/ (n+ 1).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We continue our argument in Section 3.3. Given the demand functions derived under
consumers’ expectation of a declining price sequence, profit maximization yields the
first-order conditions:
hk (1− zk − 2pk) + rk = 0
for all k. In particular, for firm n we have
hn (1− a− pn) + rn = 0 (9)
by using zn = a− pn in equilibrium, and so 1− a− pn < 0. If p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pn, then
the first-order condition for any firm k ≤ n− 1 implies
0 = hk (1− zk − 2pk) + rk ≤ hk (1− a− pk) + rk < hn (1− a− pn) + rn,
where the first inequality is because zk ≥ a− pk+1 ≥ a− pk, and the second one is
because pk ≥ pn, hk > hn and rk ≤ rn. This, however, contradicts to (9).
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